JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. "It is our unanimous opinion that . the said works will prove very much to the advantage and not in the least prejudicial or hurtful to our said borough and inhabitants thereof."1 This sanguine outlook was expressed by a local government officer, Alderman Powell, when copper smelting works were proposed in Swansea, south Wales, in 1720. At the time, Powell could not have realized the irony of his optimism. On the one hand, the emerging copper industry he was seeking to promote grew to such international importance and technological preeminence that the Swansea district became known as "Copperopolis" by the mid-19th century. On the other, copper works proved to be a serious source of industrial pollution, contributing significantly to turning the Swansea Valley into what has recently been described as "one of the most polluted landscapes in the world."2 Copper smelting and coal mining were the principal industries in the Swansea district in the 18th and 19th centuries, although the smelting of other nonferrous metals, including zinc, lead, and silver, contributed not only to the diversity of industrial activities but also DR. NEWELL was a doctoral student, Unilever Prize Research Fellow, and British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at Nuffield College in the University of Oxford. His specialist area of research is the economic history of the copper mining and smelting industries. The author is grateful to the British Academy and to Nuffield College, whose support enabled this article to be written, and thanks Simon Watts, Peter Brimblecombe, Martin Daunton, Inge Harding-Barlow, Joshua Getzler, Christopher Hall, Susan Newell, the editors of this journal and anonymous referees, and participants at seminars at All Souls College, Oxford, Oxford Brookes University, and the University of East Anglia for their help and comments. He is also indebted to his vicar, the Reverend Ken Reeves, and parishioners in Deddington, Clifton, Hempton, and the Barfords, whose forbearance allowed him sufficient time away from his current duties as a clergyman to complete this project. Copper smelting was the main contributor to the devastation of the Lower Swansea Valley. Yet although the pollution problem associated with British copper works is well known, with the exception of two articles by Ronald Rees it has received little scholarly attention. Rees examined a small number of well-publicized court cases in south Wales in the period 1833 to 1895, conveying the impression that the problem manifested itself primarily as a legal issue among farmers, landowners, and smelting companies, in a particular area within a certain time span.4 In reality, the problem was more widespread and deep-rooted than Rees suggested, and concern was expressed by a broader group than he indicated, since pollution from copper works came under the close scrutiny of a parliamentary select committee, a royal commission, the Alkali Inspectorate, and other official bodies at the national and local levels. This article, therefore, takes a wider perspective by considering the social costs of atmospheric pollution from copper works and the ways in which these costs impinged upon smelting companies in the form of pressure from public lobbying, legal action, and local and national government legislation. It also considers the responses of smelting companies to these pressures, especially technological innovations designed to disperse atmospheric pollutants or to recover them as marketable by-products.
The British Copper Industry
The period from the 1690s to the 1920s witnessed the rise and decline of the British copper smelting industry. In this time, the industry emerged from small beginnings to achieve international prominence, such that by the early part of the 19th century British copper production accounted for nearly half the estimated world total. Peak production was reached in the 1890s, although by then British output was relatively small in international terms.5 A major factor in the successful development of the British copper industry was the availability of cheap supplies of coal that were ideally suited to smelting. Copper was one of the first metals to be smelted commercially using coal, and the industry's rapid growth stemmed from the use of coal-fired reverberatory furnaces. With a Atmospheric Pollution and the British Copper Industry fuel-to-ore ratio of more than two to one, it was rational to locate smelting works near coalfields rather than copper mines and to transport the ore to the coal so as to minimize freight costs. As a result, copper smelting in Britain became focused on two main locations during the 18th century: St. Helens and Liverpool near the Lancashire coalfield and, more important, the Swansea district on the southwestern edge of the south Wales coalfield (see fig. 1 ).
During the late 17th and 18th centuries, most of the copper ore utilized by British smelters was obtained from the British Isles, particularly from Cornwall, although mines in Anglesey enjoyed a brief success toward the end of this period. From the late 1820s, however, the opening up of overseas mining fields and the relaxation of tariffs led to the influx of ore imports, and Britain-especially Swanseabecame the principal destination for copper ores mined in South and North America, Cuba, Australia, southern Africa, and elsewhere, as well as for British ores. Although attempts were made to establish smelting works overseas to tap these new supplies of ore, technical difficulties and the lack of suitable fuel prevented their initial success, to the benefit of British smelters.
During the second half of the 19th century, further developments in copper processing technology in the United States and elsewhere overcame most of the difficulties that had led to ores being exported to Britain and extended the range of ores that could be mined. For instance, new methods were introduced to process low-grade pyritic ores, which enabled ores of 2 percent to 3 percent copper content to be exploited profitably, whereas previously the break-even point had been nearer 10 percent. However, the ratio of ore to fuel required in these processes favored preliminary on-site treatment of ores, and so Britain increasingly became the destination for partly smelted ore known as "regulus," which required only the final stages of smelting. More significant still was the successful adoption of the Bessemer process in copper smelting. Not only did this reduce significantly the overall fuel-to-ore ratio, but it also dispensed with the large number of furnace stages required in the smelting process. Together, these factors removed the economic and technological advantages held by British copper smelting companies, and eventually the widespread introduction of the Bessemer process led to full smelting taking place at or near copper mines in other countries and consequently to the rapid decline of exports of ore and regulus to Britain. This, together with the collapse of the Cornish mining industry in the 1860s and 1870s, signaled the end of the British copper smelting industry, which was almost extinct by the early 1920s. Thus, within a period of 230 years, a small British industry had both 659 660 Edmund Newell grown to international prominence and succumbed to international competition as technological change removed the comparative advantage Britain held over other smelting locations.
Copper Smoke
Throughout the history of the British copper smelting industry, atmospheric pollution proved to be a contentious issue. This is not surprising, since smelter smoke has caused concern in many places where metals have been manufactured. Historical studies have highlighted the problem in 19th-century Spain, Germany, and the United States. In Britain, the Swansea region was singled out in a national geochemical survey as having been particularly affected by atmospheric pollution, not only from the copper industry but also from the numerous other metal works that operated in the area.6
Until its decline, the copper industry was the principal contributor to Swansea's pollution problems, and "copper smoke"-a cocktail of noxious vapors and particles given off by ores when smelted, mixed with coal smoke from furnace fuel-was acknowledged as one of the most potent forms of industrial pollution in Britain. As most copper ores, and Cornish ores in particular, had a high sulfur content and often contained fluorspar, copper smelting produced strong concentrations of the toxic gases sulfur dioxide and hydrogen fluoride, which reacted with moisture in the air to form sulfurous (H2SO3), sulfuric (H2SO4), and hydrofluoric (HF) acids. This has led one historian to describe copper smoke as "the 'acid rain' scandal of its day."7 But acid rain was not the only problem. The smoke itself was frequently inhaled by furnace workers and the local population; moreover, particles of copper, sulfur, arsenic, lead, antimony, silver, and other pollutants found in copper ores were deposited on the surrounding countryside. This dry deposition probably had a more serious effect on the local environment than the acid rain. This is not to suggest that Swansea was constantly shrouded in a pall of smoke. As one observer noted early in the 19th century, "the idea of it [Swansea] being impregnated with smoke from the copperworks is an unfounded prejudice."8 Indeed, the town was able to function both as a location for heavy industry and as a fashionable seaside resort. But as the century progressed, the town became more industrialized, and the pollution problem worsened as the volume of copper smoke increased and was discharged over a wider area. Elsewhere in Britain, Llanelli, Liverpool, Tyneside, Anglesey, and Hayle were also affected by fumes from local copper smelters, and copper smoke compounded the severe pollution problems of St. Helens, which also suffered from high levels of atmospheric pollution from alkali and other industrial works.9
The scale of the pollution is hard to quantify. A pair of travelers commented wryly that in Swansea the smoke ascended "not in 'volumes,' but in 'encyclopaedias,' "10 as portrayed dramatically in figure 2. More scientifically, the French sociologist Frederic Le Play, in an earlier career as a metallurgist, calculated in the mid-1840s that about 92,000 tons of sulfurous acid was projected into the atmosphere annually by Swansea smelters.1 In comparison with other available data, this output from copper works alone is approximately equivalent to the sulfur dioxide emission from all industrial and domestic sources in London in 1814 (when the damaging effect of coal smoke in the capital was already notorious) and is just under half the total for the city of York in the early 20th century.12 A study of the Llanelli Copper Company by Newell and Watts shows that the output of atmospheric pollution from the company's works in the 1860s was exceptionally high and spread over a large area, covering south Wales and beyond. The output of pollutants from these works alone would be regarded as serious by today's safety standards. For instance, estimated emissions of the heavy metals lead, arsenic, anti- As the industry expanded from the 1820s, such isolated reports were replaced by a series of complaints and court cases. Overall, the copper smoke problem manifested itself in three ways: first and foremost, as a private nuisance through damage to individuals' land and livestock; second, as a public nuisance; and third, as a public and occupational health issue. In turn, these concerns prompted responses from various parties, at the local and national government levels, through public debate and activity, and by legal action. As will be shown, only the last of these posed a serious threat to smelting companies, although a desire to maintain good public relations may also have induced smelters to take action. On their part, smelting companies responded in three ways to the problem: some did nothing, others made out-of-court settlements with those whose property was affected, and a few turned to technological solutions, either to reduce the level of emissions or to recover pollutants as marketable by-products.
Pollution and Public and Private Nuisance Law
In law, private nuisance refers to the unreasonable interference with another's use or enjoyment of his or her land, and public nuisance is that which obstructs or causes inconvenience or discomfort to the public. Awareness of potential legal action over nuisance and the early intervention of the local corporation to zone industry ensured that smelting works in Swansea were located on the eastern edge of the town so that the prevailing westerly winds blew the smoke across wasteland. However, northerly and northwesterly winds frequently brought smoke across the town, and places farther up the Swansea Valley, such as Llansamlet and Morriston, were often affected (see fig. 3 ). In Neath, copper smoke was probably less of a problem given the location of the smelting works, but the works in and around Llanelli were less favorably situated to the south and to the west, so that its population was at greater risk.20 When the wind The damp atmosphere and high levels of rainfall made acid rain a problem in the towns, as could be seen from its effects on stone and paintwork and the discoloration and corrosion of windows. Its effect on vegetation could be devastating and almost instantaneous. As one farmer complained, "it shrivels up the grass and the straw almost as if a dash of lightning had gone over it."23 Land in close proximity to the copper works affected by both acid rain and the dry deposition of pollutants, such as the western side of Kilvey Hill in Swansea, was often completely denuded (see fig. 2 ). The grass Melica coerulea was even regarded as a botanical curiosity, as it was the only plant that could withstand copper smoke near the Amlwch works on Anglesey.24 At greater distances from copper works the concentration of smoke was diluted and the damage less severe, but the effects of acid rain and dry deposition of pollutants were still noticeable. It was claimed that animals grazing within a radius of several miles of certain works suffered poisoning from arsenic, and there were frequent complaints about "smoke disease," or efrydddod, the symptoms of which were swollen joints and rotting teeth, which would eventually kill the animals unless they were removed to better pasture.25 Such was the extent of damage caused by copper smoke that landowners in Cornwall often forbade any preliminary on-site smelting of copper ores in mineral leases granted to mining companies.26
Copper smoke was clearly an inconvenience to many. In legal terms, the general effect on the community left smelting companies open to indictment for public nuisance (as with the Macclesfield Copper Company), while damage to individuals' property made companies liable to private nuisance actions. Given the repeated evidence of copper smoke damaging property, it might be supposed that smelting companies constantly faced legal actions which they found difficult to defend. This was not so. To begin with, local attitudes toward the industry limited the number of potential plaintiffs. Furthermore, many victims of the damage were discouraged from taking legal action because of the high cost and low probability of bringing a successful lawsuit against a firm. The widow's lone bosom I thrill with joy As I fill the hands of her orphan boy, The miner I help in the sunless cave; By me rich merchants their fortunes save; Barristers, bankers, and even clod-hoppers Would feel very small if they hadn't "some coppers."27 Those who perhaps suffered the most personal discomfort from copper smoke were employees of copper works and others living in industrial communities near the works, such as Morriston and Vivian Town, but no reports have come to light to suggest that copper smoke was ever the subject of industrial action on their part. Others badly affected were landowners and farmers with land on the outskirts of the town. Of these, the farmers were the more active complainants against smelting companies. The more influential landowners had substantial interests in local industry and would have been reluctant to involve themselves in disputes that threatened the existence of industrial works. When asked if his landlord, the earl ofJersey, was concerned about the damage to his agricultural land, the smelter Pascoe Grenfell commented, "I do not believe LordJersey would give you a shilling to get his farm back, because his collieries [which supplied the copper works] and cottages for colliers and others pay him fifty times as much as the land.... I should think that one week of his royalties from coal would pay all his agricultural rent for the year from Llansamlet."28 Nevertheless, the earl was involved in several disputes with smelters to obtain compensation for 
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Edmund Newell damage to his land, which will be described later, although there was no question of his seeking an indictment against the offending companies to put them out of operation.
The Swansea Corporation, which could have indicted smelting companies for public nuisance, limited its involvement initially to influencing the location of the industry in its early years. Although the corporation sought to promote Swansea as a seaside resort, it did not allow this to conflict with the development of industry, which was seen as the backbone of the local economy.29 This favorable attitude toward the copper industry was further apparent in 1820, when a senior officer of the corporation was petitioned to convene a meeting of inhabitants to discuss measures to curb the smoke problem that were "consistent with the prosperity of the copper works."30 In October of the following year, a fund was established "for obviating the inconvenience arising from the smoke produced by smelting copper ores." In total, just over ?1,000 was raised, of which about one third came from the subscriptions of landowners, nearly half from those with interests in copper smelting ( Atmospheric Pollution and the British Copper Industry In the absence of local authority involvement, legal action was left in the hands of private individuals such as Phillips. Those who took smelting companies to court faced a number of difficulties. First, the onus was on the plaintiff to prove that damage caused to his or her property was the result of pollution from a particular source. In practice, identifying a single source proved difficult in areas where there were several copper works (as in Swansea) or where other polluters, such as chemical works, were in close proximity (as in St. Helens). Second, to achieve an unambiguously successful prosecution the plaintiff either had to prove that the entire damage to his or her property was the result only of copper smoke or had to provide evidence of the extent of the damage caused by smoke. Again, the practical difficulties of doing so were great.
More generally, studies by Brenner and McLaren argue that nuisance law became increasingly ineffective in dealing with pollution associated with rapid industrialization.33 At the time, they claim, the law of nuisance was not normally regarded as a way of obtaining compensation from polluters but was seen as a means of eliminating the source of pollution by injunction (although the instances of damages being awarded in copper smoke cases outlined below suggest this may be an exaggeration). Both Brenner and McLaren contend that during the 18th century, the law favored the plaintiff, particularly in nonindustrial areas where offending works were recently established. In a private action, the plaintiff could claim "prior appropriation" of the land for agricultural purposes, forcing firms to move elsewhere. Similarly, in a public nuisance action, local authorities were in a strong position to force the relocation of works and hence effect the zoning of industry within the locality. However, according to McLaren, this degree of protection broke down in the early 19th century. In the absence of a large number of court cases, and with rapid industrialization, it seems that the courts became strongly influenced by arguments about the economic benefits of industry to the wider community and less well disposed to private nuisance actions. The concept of reasonableness became firmly established; it was deemed reasonable for individuals to put up with a certain degree of discomfort from pollution for the sake of the general economic benefit of industry to the community. The zoning of industry reinforced this view, and once industry became firmly established in a part of town (as was the case with the copper works , it became increasingly difficult to prosecute firms unless they acted in a way to worsen or spread pollution. In such cases, the onus was on the plaintiff to prove that conditions had deteriorated, which again proved difficult in practice. This point is illustrated by the opinion of a lawyer, in a copper smoke nuisance case of the 1890s, who summarized the problems faced by those taking smelting companies to court: "The claimants will know that the Defendants will fight to the death[,] that success will cost them a lot of money and that failure will ruin them and they know that any jury will be very slow to find in their favor. Tipping v St. Helens Smelting Co. is of special interest. William Tipping, a wealthy landowner, purchased the 1,300-acre Bold Hall estate in St. Helens in 1860. At the time of purchase, Tipping was aware that copper works were being erected on adjoining land. Once the works were operational, Tipping's land was damaged by copper smoke readily identifiable as coming from these works. Despite the fact that he had moved to Bold Hall knowing that damage to his property was likely, Tipping brought an action for damages against the smelting company on two counts: first, for injury to trees, hedges, fruit and cattle; and second, for severe personal discomfort. Tipping was awarded damages, and on appeal the House of Lords upheld the decision on the first claim of damage to property but not on the second claim of discomfort. Tipping then obtained an injunction against the copper company, which was forced to close its works and relocate elsewhere in St. Helens. Despite Tipping's victory, the House of Lords's ruling was significant, as, according to legal historians, it made successful nuisance actions on grounds of discomfort "virtually impossible in the industrial midlands and regions such as Swansea and Cardiff."36
Perhaps the best known of the south Wales nuisance cases was the "Great Copper Trial" of David v Vivian at the Carmarthen Assizes in 1834. Thomas David represented a group of eleven tenant farmers from the village of Llansamlet who, with the help of Merthyr Tydfil solicitor William Meyrick, had formed a club to indict Vivian and
Sons for public nuisance. It was decided to bring the action in Carmarthen, as it was felt that no jury in Glamorgan would return a verdict against a copper smelter. In his summing up, the judge stated that the distress of a handful of farmers did not constitute the public nuisance required for an indictment against the company, and the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. The Swansea newspaper the Cambrian reported that the news of the verdict "has diffused the greatest joy throughout this town and neighbourhood, which has been manifested by the ringing of bells and the firing of cannon throughout the day."37 The Carmarthen verdict did not deter the farmers. In the following year, David brought an action for damage to his land against Pascoe Grenfell and Son at the Breconshire Assizes, this time seeking financial compensation.38 In coming to its verdict, the jury acknowledged that the plaintiff had suffered smoke damage to his land, but it attributed the poor quality of David's land Smelting companies could nevertheless be sympathetic toward what they considered to be reasonable complaints of damage and were prepared to consider ways of compensating victims out of court. In the buildup to the first major dispute involving Vivian and Sons in the 1820s, John Vivian readily acknowledged culpability in damaging property and suggested that an independent referee be appointed to determine the level of compensation his firm should pay. Vivian feared that legal action could lead either to the enforced relocation of his works or the setting of excessively high levels of damages, which could put the firm out of business. In the event, Vivian's offer of arbitration was rejected, and the firm successfully defended the legal action brought against it, in spite of Vivian's earlier admission.39 But entering into private arrangements had its disadvantages. By making such arrangements firms effectively admitted liability, which would normally increase the probability of legal action being taken by those seeking compensation, who would now be relatively sure of their success. It might also encourage others in the locality to bring charges. For instance, in about 1840, Newton, Keates and Company of St. Helens faced complaints of damage to land by a group of local farmers. To avoid lawsuits, the company made an arrangement with the farmers to appoint an assessor to fix levels of compensation. Eventually, the arrangement broke down, and legal action followed. This action may have opened the way for further disputes, as there are more reported complaints against this company than any other.4 The lack of references to similar compensation arrangements may be a result of the scarcity of extant copper smelting records, or it may reflect an unwillingness on the part of companies to risk the sort of problems apparently faced by Newton, Keates and Company.
Later, in south Wales, a different type of arrangement was entered into. Following an assessment that showed that the value of agricultural land in smoke-affected districts had fallen by half, local landowner Nash Vaughan (chairman of an association formed by land- In this case, the plaintiffs were unsuccessful, being unable to prove that the amount of damage caused to their property had increased over the past twenty years.41
To summarize, the law offered little protection against or compensation for the effects of copper smoke. Although a few successful actions were brought against smelting companies (by those who could afford to do so), the copper industry was associated with bringing prosperity to the Swansea region and the country as a whole and was therefore regarded favorably in the courts, where it became increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to achieve success in nuisance cases. The early zoning of the industry also meant that by the 19th century copper smoke had become acceptable in certain areas under the principle that "what would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be one in Bermondsey."42 As a consequence, while the possibility of legal action was an ever-present concern to copper smelters, successful prosecutions were rare.
Technology
Despite the limited success of legal action against smelting companies, a number of firms did invest (some quite heavily) in methods to deal with copper smoke. It would appear, however, that the driv- Edmund Newell ing force had less to do with altruistic motives than with the desire to reduce the potential threat of legal action, to comply with legal requirements, and, perhaps most important, to benefit economically from the recovery of by-products that otherwise quite literally went up in smoke. The earliest and most widely used technology involved constructing tall chimney stacks to which all or most of the furnaces at a copper works were connected by long flues. Some of the arsenic, sulfur, and hydrofluoric acid would condense in the flues and the stacks as the smoke cooled, and that which passed out of the stacks was dispersed more widely. Materials collected in the flues could be used to produce by-products, such as arsenic and sulfuric acid.
Commercial interest in recovering sulfur during copper smelting was first shown in the late 18th century. During the 1770s, the Bristol industrialist John Champion Jr. entered into partnership with William Roe of the Macclesfield Copper Company to recover sulfur during the initial process of smelting known as calcination, in which the majority of the sulfur was expelled. Their Brimstone Company processed ore mined on Anglesey under the following terms with the mining companies. The Brimstone Company was permitted to erect calciners on the mine site at an annual rent of ?50. The mining companies supplied Brimstone with ore from which sulfur was extracted, and Brimstone returned the processed ore to the mining companies. In this way, the two commercial operations were kept separate. The Brimstone Company had complete control over the production and sale of sulfur while the mining companies benefited from having ore that was cheaper to transport to smelting works because of its reduced bulk and was easier to smelt because of its lower sulfur content. The process used on Anglesey has been described byJoan Day, who suggests that it may have been used at an earlier date by copper smelters in the Bristol area. It would seem, however, that the costs of the process and the low price of sulfur meant the process was not a commercial success, although the fate of the Brimstone Company itself is not known.43
A similar method to that used on Anglesey was adopted and improved byJohn Henry Vivian at the Hafod works in the 1820s. Vivian's initial scheme also incorporated water showers placed in the flues and in chambers connected to the flues to increase the rate at which the gases condensed, although the company later stopped us- ing the showers, claiming that "the use of water was not so essential as it was first thought."44 This method of treating copper smoke received much publicity, being associated with the competition held in Swansea in the early 1820s "for obviating the inconvenience arising from the smoke produced by smelting copper ores." It also attracted the attention of some of the most eminent scientists of the time. Sir Humphry Davy showed interest in Vivian's experiments, and Vivian employed Michael Faraday and Richard Phillips to conduct tests on the equipment, providing an interesting example of the use of applied science in industry.45 It is not surprising that with this backing, and having invested more than ?6,000 in the equipment, Vivian's method was recommended to other smelters by the committee of the competition as the best means of dealing with the problem. The project, which demonstrated Vivian's ability to apply scientific principles to industrial processes, also helped the smelter to be elected to a prestigious Fellowship of the Royal Society. Other companies adopted this method (with or without the addition of showers), and some of the constructions were extremely large and expensive, notably those built at the Llanelli, Pembrey, Spitty, and Cwmavon works.46 The first of the Llanelli Copper Company's two large stacks, completed inJanuary 1831, was 230 feet high, the Pembrey stack was 270 feet high, and the second Llanelli stack, built in 1861 and known as StacFawr ("Big Stack"), was 320 feet high.47
In 1832, a lease drawn up between the Borough of Avan, Port Talbot, and John Vigurs for the establishment of what eventually became the Cwmavon works even stipulated that a chimney approved by engineers had to be erected "for the purpose of condensing or removing the injurious properties of the smoke or effluvia."48 Eventually, a system was constructed whereby forty-two furnaces were connected to a flue nearly a mile long that ran up the side of a large hill to a stack, the top of which was at a height of more than 1,000 feet. Further interest was also shown about this time in dealing with copper smoke on Anglesey, presumably along similar lines. In a let- 
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Edmund Newell ter to the manager of the Mona Mine Company, a "discovery" for condensing smoke was discussed, and its author noted, "That the discovery is an effectual one condensing the sulphur, and many other noxious substances, I think has been proved, by there not being a single complaint by any of the farmers since it was first applied, now full 2 years, and by another proof of my having a field of wheat close by the foot of the mountain."49 This method of control, which was used in a variety of metal works, certainly prevented high levels of damage in the immediate vicinity of the works, but it failed to eliminate the smoke problem. Sulfur dioxide emissions were hardly reduced, and the tall stacks increased the area affected by pollution. The Swansea smelter Pascoe Grenfell realized the implications of spreading pollution and refused to build large chimneys, believing it could lead to more rather than fewer legal disputes.50 Vivian and Sons certainly faced a major court case in 1833, just after increasing the number of stacks and flues at the Hafod works; the actions brought against the Cwmavon works by Nash Vaughan and Emily Talbot followed the construction of its apparatus, and Vaughan's estate was more than 7 miles away from the Cwmavon works.
John Henry Vivian and others recognized in the 1820s that the copper smoke problem might best be tackled by improved furnace technology.51 Most copper smoke was produced in the first process of smelting, known as calcination, which was used to remove large amounts of sulfur. It was argued that it was theoretically possible to conduct this process and at the same time oxidize the sulfur driven off the ore to produce sulfuric acid in the furnace, thus eliminating sulfurous gas emissions at source. The chemistry was understood, but developing the equipment was another matter. The basic problem was that the oxidation necessary to produce sulfuric acid was Despite the technical difficulties, two types of furnace were devised that could overcome the problem, and both were used commercially to a limited extent from the 1860s. The first to be developed was the muffle furnace, which kept the copper smoke fumes separate from the coal smoke by heating the ore, which was laid out on a flat bed, from underneath the bed, there being no direct contact between the ore and the heat source. This furnace was favored by the smelter Peter Spence, who went on to use his own patented design in the Goole Alum and Smelting Works. Versions of the muffle furnace were also used by Charles Lambert at the Port Tennant Works in Swansea and by Newton, Keates and Company in St. Helens.53 The second type of furnace, developed by Moritz Gerstenh6fer in Germany, where smelter smoke was also becoming a serious problem,54 produced very little coal smoke, as it required fuel only to begin calcination. Once ignited, the furnace used the sulfur in the ore as fuel, thus eliminating the presence of coal smoke and indeed significantly reducing the amount of coal required in calcination. Vivian and Sons purchased the British patent for the Gerstenhofer furnace,55 which received highly favorable reports in the Times as well as the local press, being hailed as the solution to the copper smoke problem.56
The encouraging publicity was brought about to a large extent by a pamphlet entitled "On the Improvement of Swansea: Suppression of Copper Smoke," written by a prominent and influential Swansea figure and friend of the Vivians, George Grant-Francis.57 Such claims were premature, however, as in practice both types of furnace had major limitations. At best the furnaces could remove only 33 to 40 percent of the sulfur, and neither furnace was suited for smelting ores of less than 20 percent sulfur content; indeed, the Gerstenhofer furnace could not operate with a lower proportion of sulfur. This limited the applicability of these to a smelting industry that by that time was handling an increasing quantity of imported ores with a 52For Schafheutl, see Percy (n. 11 above), pp. 340-41; for Gurlt, see Grant-Francis (n. 14 above), p. 123, and Cambrian, October 27, 1865. In the main, the profitability of sulfuric acid as a by-product of copper smelting was questionable. As a bulky, low-cost good, sulfuric acid could be sold profitably only to local buyers. In Swansea, the scope for selling acid was very limited, the principal users being tinplate manufacturers who required the acid for "pickling," or removing scale and impurities from sheets of iron prior to plating.59 Vivian and Sons also opened superphosphate fertilizer works and alkali works to utilize the acid. At Lambert's Port Tennant works, the acid was used in the manufacture of copper sulfate, but Lambert regarded this enterprise as a loss-making failure. Pascoe Grenfell decided not to introduce similar apparatus, as he felt it was not worth the expense.60 Thus, only three of the eleven Swansea companies and one of the six Lancashire companies introduced the new furnaces at their works. The technology portrayed as solving the copper smoke problem therefore had very little impact overall on the industry.
The last technological advance employed to deal with copper smoke, and other metal fumes, was to pass an electrical current through flues linking furnaces to chimneys to increase the rate of precipitation of pollutants. References to experiments using this method date from 1886, although it was not until after World War I that it was adopted to any great extent. By this time copper smelting in Britain was in rapid decline, and so electrical precipitation had little opportunity to benefit the industry. However, it should be noted that Vivian and Sons were again early users of this technology, enhancing the company's reputation as that which paid greatest attention to the copper smoke problem.61 Public Health, Sanitation, and Factory Legislation Health, sanitation, and factory conditions were issues of major public concern in Victorian Britain. The copper industry came un- 
